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I. INTRODUCTION
Though the extent to which a liquidated damages clause can be
enforced by an aggrieved party in a breach of contract action is hardly
a novel question,' a new dimension was added to enforceability
determinations with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as Code]. While common-law determinations
focused on whether the liquidated damages clause was a reasonable
anticipation of the aggrieved party's harm, section 2-718(1) specifi-
cally added as a new, alternative focal point the amount of "actual"
damages sustained by the aggrieved party. This section states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof
of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining
an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated dam-
ages is void as a penalty.2
Thus, section 2-718(1) also retained the common-law focus on "an-
ticipated" damages as a time point by which to measure enforce-
ability, as well as reiterating the long extant rule that penalty-for-
breach provisions will not be allowed to masquerade as liquidated
damages clauses.
The practical meaning of section 2-718(l) has seldom been liti-
gated since the Code's widespread adoption in the 1960's.3 The New
York Court of Appeals, in Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land
Development Corp.,4 had an opportunity to undertake a detailed
analysis of section 2-718(1). This case involved a liquidated damages
clause that provided for recovery of attorney's fees in case of default
I. See, e.g., Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, 130 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1829).
2. UCC § 2-718(1) (emphasis added). No local variations of § 2-718(1) exist.
3. Research for this article has indicated that section 2-718(1) and its technical construc-
tion and operation had not received a detailed analysis in a reported decision by any court in any
jurisdiction until Equitable Lumber. The relatively few courts that have considered the statute
have usually cited the section as indicating that a liquidated damages clause must be "rea-
sonable," without delving into the tests as set out in the statute for "reasonability." See, e.g..
Northwestern Motor Car v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 295, 187 N.W.2d 200, 202 (1971), in w'hich
the court stated that "the statute contemplates that a liquidated damages clause may be en-
forceable if 'reasonable" . . . It . . . is a question to be determined after trial. Many citator
references to § 2-718(1) are merely cross references made to that section from § 2-719, which
contains a reference to "the preceding section."
4. 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391,381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976).
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by the buyer in a sales contract.5 Though attorney's fees provisions
have traditionally been analyzed by many jurisdictions as a special
category of liquidated damages,6 the New York Court of Appeals, in
applying article 2 of the Code, treated an attorney's fee provision
like any other liquidated damages provision that might be found in
a sales contract. As no direct mention was made of attorney's fees
in article 2, the court resorted to the general provisions governing
liquidated damages contained in section 2-718(1). Hence, Equitable
Lumber, as the first case to undertake a detailed analysis of section
2-718(1), has commercial impact beyond the specific area of attorney's
fees recoveries.
This Case Comment will examine the addition that section 2-718
(1) was intended to make to the common-law test for the enforceability
liquidate-I damages provisions. After scrutinizing this section's
interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals, it will suggest that
no real clarification of the subject of liquidated damages has been
effected either by the Code or the court's decision in Equitable Lum-
ber.
II. THE EQUITABLE LUMBER CASE
Equitable Lumber Corporation (plaintiff), a lumber and building
materials supplier located in Brooklyn, New York, entered into a
written sales agreement in September, 1973, with I.P.A. Land Devel-
opment Corporation (defendant), a builder and land developer en-
gaged in the construction of several houses. 7  The builder-corpora-
tion's president and manager, a member of the New York Bar,
executed the writing for I.P.A. In October 1973, one month after the
writing's execution, the plaintiff-seller delivered, pursuant to the build-
er's orders, lumber and building materials that the defendant-buyer
used in the construction of one of its buildings. Subsequently, defen-
dant refused to pay for the materials, closed its offices, and its presi-
dent moved to Spain.8
The sales agreement between these two commercial concerns
contained the following liquidated damages provision:
5. According to the court, "research has revealed that the precise question raised here
has not been considered by any other jurisdiction." 38 N.Y.2d at 518 n.l, 344 N.E.2d at 393
n.l, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461 n.1.
6. See, e.g., Mclntire v. Cogley, 37 Iowa 676 (1873). For a brief history of the subject of
attorney's fees recoveries, see Mayer and Stix, The Prevailing Part' Should Recover Counsel Fees,
8 AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975).
7. The facts of Equitable Lumber are set out at 38 N.Y.2d at 51 , 344 NE.2d at 393,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
8. The reported opinion stated that the defendant's president "fled" to Spain. 38 N.Y,2d
at 523, 344 N.E.2d at 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464. However, couisel for defendant stated in a
letter to this author that the president simply wound up the corporation's affairs s best he
could before he took a "long-planned departure for residence in Spain." However, the defen-
dant continued to be the corporation per se.
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If the Buyer breaches this contract and the enforcement thereof, or any
provision thereof, or the collection of any monies due thereunder is
turned over to an attorney, the Buyer herein agrees to pay, in addition
to all of Seller's expenses, a reasonable counsel fee; and in the event the
matter turned over is the collection of monies, such reasonable counsel
fee is hereby agreed to be thirty (30,o) per cent.9
Following the defendant's default, the plaintiff did turn the collection
of the defendant's account over to an attorney. An action was brought
in the Supreme Court of Kings County for the recovery of the pur-
chase price of the materials and the "reasonable counsel fee" stipu-
lated in the contract. The answer of the defendant was in effect a
general denial, which contained the apparently spurious defense that
a portion of the goods were not of merchantable quality.10
The trial court held that the defendant's answer was a sham and
frivolous, insofar as it denied owing $3,936.42 for the merchandise
it claimed to be nonmerchantable. But the trial court did grant de-
fendant's request for a hearing to determine the "reasonable" value
of the legal services rendered by the plaintiff's attorney. The trial
court subsequently ruled that it would substitute its own judgment
on the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee, rather than adhere
to the parties' stipulation that thirty percent of the amount recovered
was "reasonable." The result was that the court limited the attorney's
fee recovery to $450.00, after finding that a maximum of ten hours
was required to handle the matter properly. Though it was not
specifically reported, apparently the trial court determined that a fee
of $45.00 per hour for such collection proceedings was a "reason-
able" attorney's fee."
The Appellate Division, Second Department, modified the trial
court's judgment and increased the attorney's fees recovery from
$450.00 to $750.00.12 The court did not state in its memorandum
opinion whether the $750.00 figure was reached by finding that ten
hours was the time that the plaintiff's attorney should have expended
on this collection matter but that $75.00 per hour was simply a more
"reasonable" attorney's fee rate, or whether the court was awarding
a lump sum that approximated twenty percent of the purchase price
recovery.13
9. Italics were contained in the original contract. The liquidated damages clause in ques-
tion was printed on the reverse side of the contract order forms of seller. 38 N.Y.2d at 519.
344 N.E.2d at 393, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
10. Id.
11. Had the 30% provision been enforced, the recovery for attorney's fees would have
been S1,180.93. The S450.00 was a recovery of only 11.4% of the purchase price.
12. 45 App. Div. 2d 1003, 358 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1974). The 5750.00 was a recovery or 19.1%
of the purchase price.
13. In New York most of the previous litigation over the enforcement of attorney's fees
was in the context of provisions contained in promissory notes. In general, 20,,o has been seen
by New York courts as being a "reasonable" attorney's fee recovery. See, e.g., General
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The New York Court of Appeals based its opinion on article 2
of the Code and its provisions for liquidated damages, though neither
party argued the provisions of article 2. The parties' briefs dealt
with the prior cases of attorney's fees provisions in promissory notes.
Thus, the court apparently struck out on its own when it based its de-
cision on article 2. Citing the allowance for substitute or additional
remedies in section 2-719(l), t4 the court of appeals upheld the par-
ties' latitude to provide for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees.
The court also recognized that such latitude was circumscribed by
section 2-302 (pertaining to unconscionability) 5 and section 2-7,18(1)
(governing liquidated damages clauses).16 Section 2-302 was found to be
inapplicable to the facts of this case, apparently because the court was
unwilling to extend that section's avoidance powers to a contract
between two commercial parties of supposedly equal bargaining
power.1
7
In contrast, the court found the limits of section 2-718(1) to be
controlling for this sales contract. The court rejected the trial court's
Lumber Corp. v. Landa, 13 App. Div. 2d 804, 216 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961). It may be that the
Appellate Division awarded the $750.00 as a close approximation cf 20% of the purchase price
recovery, though this is mere speculation.
14. "J:T]he agreements may provide for remedies in addition or in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of dariages recoverable under this
Article . . . ." U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a).
15. If the Court as a matter of law finds the contract or any -lause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
16. See text accompanying note 2 supra for full text of U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
17. When the court refused to extend the contract avoidance powers of U.C.C. § 2-302
beyond the context of the individual consumer, it emphasized that the defendant could not
"assume the posture of a commercially illiterate consumer beguiled in a grossly unfair
bargain by a deceptive vendor or finance company.' 38 N.Y.2d at 523, 344 N.E,2d at 396,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 464. The court then cited the familiar case of Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,
59 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1969)-in which tl-e consumer would otherwise
have paid over $1,200 for a $300 freezer had the court not found the contract unconscion-
able-as "classic" ease of unconscionability.
This refusal to extend § 2-302 apparently follows the general trend of nonapplication of
"unconscionability" between commercial parties. One commentator has characterized this
trend as a "solid wall building to separate its use in consumer" deals from those involving
merchants. . . . Section 2-302 has gotten exactly nowhere as a sword to sever deals be-
tween businesses.' Duesenberg, Practitioner's View of Contract Unconscionability (U.CC. §
2-302), 8 U.C.C. L.J. 237, 241 (1976).
Though the court in Equitable Lumber did not directly ap)ly § 2-302, the result of ap-
plying "unconscionability" under that section would have been v.-ry similar if not identical to
the result that the court did reach by applying § 2-718(1). Under § 2-302 a contract clause
may be limited or voided by a court; under § 2-718(l), a contract clause for liquidated damages
is also limitable or voidable. In the former, the catch-word is "unconscionability;" in the
latter, the catch-word is "unreasonability." These two words are but different sides of the
same coin, their difference lying only in emphasis rather than significant substance. The
result is similar when a court invokes either. But if a court is wary of intrusion into the con-
tractual relationship of two commercially equal bargaining parties under § 2-302, it should be
equally wary of intrusion under the powers of § 2-718(1). If a court is to uphold the Anglo-Amer-
ican heritage of contractual freedom for commercial parties, then intrusion into those parties'
affairs should be strictly scrutinized, no matter under which specific label the court may proceed,
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determination that ten hours was required to handle this matter prop-
erly, stating that because the attorney could be expected to bill
his client on a contingent fee basis, a time-required analysis was in-
correct.18 Rather, the court stated that an analysis of the harm suf-
fered-either under the "anticipated" or the "actual" damages tests-
was the proper focus. 19 The court then remanded the case to the
trial court for further factual determinations, suggesting that the nor-
mal contingent fee charged by attorneys in the collection context
would be the standard by which "reasonability" would be determined,
and that the trial court should so determine this "normal" contingent
fee.
20
III. NON-CODE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES TREATMENT
A. Treatment of Attorney's Fees Provisions
The history of the enforceability of attorney's fees stipulations
has been a varied one. Some jurisdictions have prohibited the en-
forcement of such clauses because of public policies discouraging
unnecessary litigation and prohibiting penalties for contract defaults.2'
Ohio courts, for example, hold that stipulations for the payments of
costs and attorney's fees in promissory notes are contrary to public
policy and void.22 New York courts, in contrast, have permitted
enforcement of such provisions for at least half a century. The 1925
case of Commercial Investment Trust v. Eskew,23 though addressing
itself to the immediate area of promissory note provisions, dismissed
the claim that attorney's fees clauses encouraged litigation and were
therefore contrary to public policy. The court added that "[n]either
can [a provision for attorney's fees] be regarded fairly as a penalty or
forfeiture. . . . But if it is to be held a penalty, it is the defaulting
party who penalizes himself by his failure to fulfill his primary agree-
ment." 24
18. 38 N.Y.2d at 522, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
19. IL
20. Id Interestingly, since the corporate defendant had no realizable assets, the case
was never pursued further after the court of appeals' opinion. The attorney for the plaintiff
stated that the litigation was pressed through the appellate level in order to establish the fact
that attorney's fees could be a legitimate item for liquidation in a sales contract. Though
he was successful in this aspect, as will be seen later, the Equitable Lumber case does not
throw open the floodgates for potential plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees from defendants
without the necessity of demonstrating to the court the reasonableness of those fees.
21. See, e.g., Kittermaster v. Brossard, 105 Mich. 219, 63 N.W.75 (1895). Other jurisdic-
tions prohibiting such clauses are, e.g., Nebraska, North Carolina, and West Virginia.
22. Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St. 186.97 N.E. 372 (191 1): State ex rel Fund Comm'rs %.Taylor.
10 Ohio 378 (1841). Ohio seems to be in the minority of jurisdictions in prohibiting provisions
for the recovery of attorney's fees. See note 21 supra. Most jurisdictions do permit such pro-
visions to be enforced, usually with the stipulation that they be "reasonable." See 17 A. Jt. 2D.
Contracts § 164 (1964) and cases collected therein.
23. 126 Misc. 114, 117, 212 N.Y.S. 718, 721 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
24. Id. at 116-17 n.16, 212 N.Y.S. at 720-21 n.16.
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The courts of New York thus have a history of allowing attorneys'
fees recoveries. Throughout this history the courts have made
enforceability turn on reasonableness: "The fundamental question
posed to the New York courts is what constitutes a 'reasonable' at-
torney's fee."25  But "reasonable" is also th-e standard that New
York courts have used in general to determine the enforceability of
all types of liquidated damages provisions. In this respect, New
York courts have treated attorney's fees provisions little differently
than other liquidated damages provisions. Equitable Lumber made
no particular point of the fact that it was an attorney's fee recovery
that was being litigated; the court at the outset simply proceeded to
discuss and apply section 2-718(1). Even in the one short paragraph
that mentioned promissory note provisions for attorney's fees, the
court succinctly stated that "[c]ourts dealing with such provisions have
generally examined the reasonableness of the fee in deciding whether
they should be enforced ....
However, attorney's fees are not indistinguishable from other
liquidated damages provisions. The "injury" resulting to the ag-
grieved party by reason of having to pay attorney's fees is at least in
partial control of that aggrieved party. Presumably, he can shop
around in the legal marketplace for less expensive services; or, know-
ing that the defendant has agreed to indemnify him, he may seek the
most expensive legal help available. Unlike some losses resulting
from breach over which the aggrieved party may have little control,
attorney's fees can be manipulated. The court in Equitable Lumber
was aware of this when it indicated that the prevailing fees in the
local legal market would be a standard by which to measure reasona-
bility. But the court did not treat the effect of the Code on liquidated
damages provisions for attorney's fees as being substantially differ-
ent from other damages provisions. Thus, the Equitable Lumber
opinion, as the first since the Code's promulgation to undertake an
analysis of section 2-718(1), should therefore not be limited to the spe-
cific subject of attorney's fees.
25. Id. at 117, 212 N.Y.S. at 721.
26. 38 N.Y.2d at 522, 344 N.E.2d at 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 463. Since the Equitable Dtun.
ber decision in January 1976, two lower New York courts have had occasion to consider liqul-
dated damages provisions for attorney's fees. In a promissory note context, the appellate court
stated that "the provision for attorney's fees in the amount of 20% of any balance due should be
examined as to reasonableness." Claire Provision Co. v. Medwed Food Prods. Corp., 52 App.
Div. 2d 797, 797, 383 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355 (1976).
In a real estate lease context, the court stated that "it]he award of attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs, pursuant to a lease provision, has been deleted and the ease remanded for hearing on
the issue of reasonableness." Tuttle v. Juanis, 387 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 1976),
In both these cases, the courts cited the Equitable Lumber opinion, ostensibly an article
2 case under the Code, as authority for remanding the cases for reasonableness hearings on
attorney's fees. Equitable Lumber may thus be having the efftct in New York of casting
stricter scrutiny on all attorney's fees provisions contained in all types of commercial con-
tracts.
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B. Treatment of Liquidated Damages Provisions Prior to the Code
The concept of liquidated damages is superficially a relatively
simple one-that the parties to a contract stipulate as part of their
bargain the amount of damages to be paid to the aggrieved party in
event of default. But courts have historically struggled with such
27provisions. The area of liquidated damages clauses is one of the
few in which a court will intervene in a commercial contractual re-
lationship to relieve one of the parties from his purportedly im-
provident bargain. Courts have justified such interventions with
varied rationales.
Though a few courts have used "unconscionability" as a mode of
analyzing whether to enforce a liquidated damages provision, most
courts have begun by saying that the stipulated sum must be found
to be "reasonable." 28  The most often-used test of reasonableness is
the proposition that a court will enforce the sum stipulated for dam-
ages only if the parties could have fairly anticipated such damages
at the time of contracting.29 While this "anticipated damages test"
would be simple enough if faithfully followed, courts cannot easily
decide (if at all) what constituted a reasonable anticipation of dam-
ages at a prior point in time without examining the actual results at
the time of the litigation.30  This basic fact has generated much
confusion-confusion which persists even with the advent of section
2-718(1). At which point in time is the "reasonability" of a liqui-
dated damages clause to be determined? Is it the time of contract-
mng, with reference solely to the then "anticipated" damages, or the
time of trial, with reference to the "actual" damages sustained? And
what, if any, interrelationship should exist between these two time
points in that reasonability determination? Such questions were
never clearly answered by the pre-Code case law, nor, as will be seen,
were they answered by section 2-718(1).
As stated, both pre-Code case law and contemporary contracts
cases not covered by the Code most frequently use a test that
27. See, e.g., Ward v. Hudson River Bldg. Co., 125 N.Y. 230, 235, 26 N.E. 256. 257 (1891),
in which it was stated that any formulation of a general rule relating to the enforcement of
provisions for liquidated damages was difficult, if not impossible.
28. The practical difference between the two tests is minimal. A court will invalidate a
contract clause through "unconscionability" in much the same manner as "unreasonability."
The difference, if any, is probably on emphasis rather than substance. See note 17 supra.
29. See, e.g., Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v. Rasco, Inc., 201 Misc. 1087, 107 N.Y.S.2d
918 (Sup. Ct. 1951). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 339 (2) (Tent. Draft
No. 17, March 1977) provides that "[a]n amount of money fixed as damages is liquidated dam-
ages and not a penalty if it is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by
the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss."
30. In assessing whether the stipulated sum for damages was reasonable at the time of
contract formation, courts are virtually forced to look at what happened subsequently to de-
termine what the parties' intentions were at the time of contract formation. "IThe court
cannot help but be influenced by its knowledge of subsequent events." 5 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1063 (1964).
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theoretically focuses solely upon the time of contract formation-
whether the damages stipulated in the contract by the parties consti-
tute a fair and reasonable pre-estimate of the damages. Even as
late as 1974, the New York Court of Appeals, in a non-Code case
could state:
Where ... damages flowing from a breach are difficult to as-
certain, a provision fixing the damages in advance will be upheld if the
amount [stipulated in the contract] is a reasonable measure of the antici-
pated probable harm. . . . If on the other hand, the amount fixed is
grossly disproportionate to the anticipated probable harm or if there were
no anticipatable harm, the provision will not be enforced.3t
This opinion is only the most recent of a long line32 of New York cases
that "speak as though with one voice that the reasonableness of
the sum fixed in the agreement is to be determined as of the time
of the making of the agreement and not as of the time of the
breach. 3  Thus, under the traditional rule of New York and other
courts, disparity or unreasonableness is not to be ascertained by the
loss that actually ensues, but rather by the situation as it existed
at the time of making the contract.
But even as the New York cases speak this standard "with one
voice," the same courts usually have also either explicitly stated or
implicitly recognized that a gross variance between the stipulated
sum and the actual damages sustained will preclude enforceability,
even if a court could find that the stipulated sum was a reasonable
anticipation of the aggrieved party's damages. 3" Equitable Lumber
recognized this principle when it stated that New York courts have
"refused to enforce a liquidated damages provision which fixed
damages grossly disproportionate to the harm actually sustained, or
likely to be sustained by the non-breaching party."3
5
31. City of Rye v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 315 N.E.2d 458, 459,
358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1974) (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 172, 129 N.E. 461, 463 (1920); Dunn v.
Morgenthau, 73 App. Div. 147 (1902), afl'd mem, 175 N.Y. 518, 67 N.E. 1081 (1903); Down-
town Harvard Lunch Club v. Rasco, Inc., 201 Misc. 1087, 107 N.E.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1951); 14
N.Y. JUR. Damages § 162 (1969).
33. Crowley, New York Law of Damages Revisited, 4 NEw YORK CONTINUINO LGAL
EDUCATION 59, 63 (1966).
34. See, e.g., Cotheal v. Talmadge, 9 N.Y. 551, 554 (1854), which held that a liquidated
damages clause will be enforced "unless it be so grossly disproportionate to the actual injury
that a man would start at the bare mention of it." Indeed, this language of "start at the bare
mention" seems to be more of a classic formulation of unconscionability, which may indicate
the lack of precise distinction between the two concepts of unconscionability and un-
reasonability. See note 17 supra.
35. 38 N.Y.2d at 522, 344 N.E.2d at 395-96, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 463. The court quoted from
the case of Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 223, 192 N.E, 297, 301 (1934),
which stated that "liquidated damages constitute the compensation which the parties have
agreed must be paid in satisfaction of the loss, or injury which will follow from a breach of con-
tract. They must bear reasonable proportion to the actual loss."
[Vol. 38:437
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This condition, placed on the finding of reasonability under an
anticipated damages analysis, can be analyzed in two ways. The
first analysis proceeds on the basis of unconscionability as that con-
cept has been traditionally defined. But the court in Equitable Lum-
ber explicitly refused to apply the unconscionability avoidance
powers of section 2-302.36
The second possible analysis is that the time honored common-
law test is not purely one of whether the stipulated sum is reasonable
as anticipated damages, but rather it is a "hybrid" test of "reason-
able-as-anticipated, but not to disproportionately exceed actual dam-
ages." Confusion has arisen from this proposition on the effect that
"actual" damages should have on the reasonability determination, as
courts-though cognizant of the essence of this "hybrid" test's condition
-have continued to adhere to the traditional language of "anticipated
damages."37
What is this hybrid test? Does a double reasonability test ac-
tually apply-does a plaintiff have to prove both that a stipulated
damages clause is reasonable at the time of contracting and in rela-
tion to the losses that actually occurred? Or is the amount of
losses actually incurred merely evidence helpful in determining what
was reasonable at the time of contracting? Or, simply, if the tradi-
tional language is to be strictly applied, need a plaintiff show any
actual loss at all? A sampling of the cases suggests that no definitive
choice has been made by the courts, as they have used language from
which any of the above formulations could be inferred. 38  However
lacking in precision the emphasis to be given "actuar' damages under
the hybrid test, the Equitable Lumber opinion reaffirmed the con-
tinuing application of the general principle of the hybrid formula to
non-Code cases in New York.39  In essence, the "anticipated" dam-
ages test should actually be deemed the "anticipated-actual damages
test."
36. See note 17 supra and.accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., City of Rye v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 315 N.E.2d
458, 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1974).
38. See Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 223, 192 N.E. 297, 301 (1934)
("Liquidated damages constitute the compensation which the parties have agreed must be paid
in satisfaction of the loss or injury which will follow from a breach of contract. They must bear
reasonable proportion to the actual loss:); McCann v. Albany, 158 N.Y. 634, 53 N.E. 673
(1899) (a liquidated damages clause was denied enforcement as only nominal damages were
sustained by breach); Realworth Props., Inc. v. Bachler, 33 Misc. 2d 39, 45, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910,
916 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (The validity of the liquidated damages clause depends upon the situation
as of the date of the agreement and the sum agreed upon as a reasonable estimate of the then
probable damage. "But it is also said that the courts, besides considering the factual situation
confronting the parties at the time of agreement, will also consider the equity and reasonable-
ness of the result after breach.")
39. 38 N.Y.2d at 522, 344 N.E.2d at 395, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 463. See note 35 supra and
accompanying text.
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IV. SECTION 2-718(1) AND THE "ACTUAL" DAMAGES TEST
A. "Actual" as an Alternative to "Anticipated" Damages
With the enactment of the Code, a new criterion was explicitly
added to the rationale of that unbroken40 line of New York decisions
that perfunctorily held that the validity of a liquidated damages
provision is to be determined by its reasonability at the time of
contracting. The Code merely made explicitly available what was
routinely used: an examination of "actuar' damages in determining
the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause. Section 2-718(1)
did not change the basic goal of determining "reasonability" in order
to enforce a liquidated damages provision. Section 2-718(1) pur-
ports merely to add another test, another time focus by which reason-
ability can be determined.41
Section 2-718(1) appears to add the alternative of examining the
actual damages resulting from a breach as a new route to finding
that the stipulated sum of a damages clause is reasonable and there-
by enforceable.42 The key, of course, is the meaning to be given to
the phrase, "an amount which is reasonable in light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach." The purported promise of
section 2-718(1) is that an aggrieved party has two alternative
chances for his liquidated damages provision to be upheld, and that
the aggrieved party now has "a bit more liberality [than] existed in
the cases prior to the Code. 43  The situation apparently contem-
plated by the Code drafters was that if a liquidated damages sum
were to fail one alternative of the section 2-718(1) test it could still
be redeemed by meeting reasonability under the other alternative.
4
40. See Crowley, supra note 33, at 63.
41. U.C.C. § 2-718(l) states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by
the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is void as a penalty.
(Emphasis added).
42. Two other criteria are set out in § 2-718(1) for determining reasonableness: "difficulties
of proof of loss" and "inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy." These two criteria have been characterized as being virtually identical by Professor
Crowley. Crowley, supra note 33, at 75. Moreover, they seldom have been found to be dis-
positive of a liquidated damages question. As the court in Equitabk Lumber did not examine
these criteria in its opinion, this Case Comment will not examine the apparent non-use of these
two criteria. Moreover, Crowley points out in this context that "the courts will be guided
more by the conscionability or unconscionability of the situation rather than by the precise
language of the statute." Crowley, supra note 33, at 77.
43. 3A UCC REPORTER (BEDER'S) § 14.08.
44. Initially, the first criterion of § 2-718(1), the "anticipated or actual" damages language,
is susceptible to differing interpretations of construction. The mosv easily accepted construc-
tion-and the one adopted by the Equitable Lumber court-is a disjunctive one: that a liquidated
damages clause will be enforceable if the amount stipulated therein is reasonable when analyzed
as either "anticipated" damages or "actual" damages or both.
The less tenable construction, inferring a legislative intent to make the new Code test even
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This promise of more "liberality," however, proves to be illusory in
the normal commercial sales contract context.
With the addition of actual damage as an alternative focal point,
a stipulated damages sum can find enforceability even if, as antici-
pated damages, the sum was unreasonable-or at least this is the
theoretical possibility of the disjunctive "or" in section 2-718(1).45
But expressly treating actual damages as an alternative focal point
fails to recognize the logical and pragmatic-though ill-defined-influ-
ence that actual damages had routinely exercised in prior case law
determinations. Properly seen, the addition of "actuar' only makes
explicitly available to the court what was implicitly used anyway-a
post hoc ergo propter hoc logic of liquidated damages validation.
In essence, alongside the previous focus on anticipated damages
-which implicitly contained the condition that anticipated damages
stipulated must bear a general proportionality to the actual losses-
is now added an alternative focus simply on actual damages. But
the two were already so interrelated that the addition may not signal
any affirmative change and may only add more confusion to this
previously cloudy area. If a court should state that the stipulated
sum is enforceable because it was "reasonable as anticipated dam-
ages" has it not taken into account actual damages? Moreover, even
if a court should find reasonability of the stipulated sum as antici-
pated damages and not proceed to the new alternative, the party
against whom the stipulated sum is to be enforced would be likely
to call the court's attention to actual damages in an attempt to dis-
credit the court's finding of reasonability at the anticipated damages
time point. As Professor Crowley has stated, section 2-718(l) "[does]
not reduce the confusion surrounding the application of the principle
more stringent than that imposed by the prior case law, is that the liquidated damages clause
will be void if the amount stipulated is disproportionate when tested by either one or the other
of the two time references. That is, an invalidity in one and only one will invalidate the entire
clause, even it would pass muster under the other time reference.
Professor Hawkland notes that
a stipulation of damages that is reasonably related to the anticipated harm at the time
of the stipulation, is not necessarily invalidated because it fails to forecast correctly
the damages that were actually suffered. Conversely, even if the stipulation of damages
does not reasonably reflect a fair judgment of anticipated harm as of the time of its
making, it is validated by events that put it in line with the damages which actually
occur.
1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSAcIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 171
(1964).
The New York Law Revision Commission, prior to the New York enactment of the Code,
did recognize the possibility of a more restrictive interpretation, but opined that the alterna-
tive, disjunctive interpretation was preferable. I NEw YORK LAW RE VISION CoMMLsSIO.,
1955 REPORT 581. The Equitable Lumber decision followed the Revision Commission in
adopting the alternative test, stating, "a liquidated damages provision will be valid if rea-
sonable with respect to either (1) the harm which the parties anticipate will result from the
breach at the time of contracting, or (2) the actual damages suffered by the non-defaulting
party at the time of the breach." 38 N.Y.2d at 521, 344 N.E.2d at 395, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
45. Crowley, supra note 33, at 72.
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of liquidated damages; rather [it] appear[s] to perpetuate the confu-
sion.' 46
B. The Interrelation of "Actual" and "Anticipated"
When anticipated damages were theoretically the sole focal point
of the reasonability determination, only three outcomes were possible.
As an anticipation of damages, the stipulated sum could be 1) dis-
proportionately excessive ("too high"), 2) approximately correct, or
3) disproportionately low ("too low"). For an examination only of
"actual" damages, the same three outcomes are still the only ones
possible.
However, these three possible outcomes for each of the two
analyses (anticipated or actual) can be interrelated to form nine
combinations: e.g., though the stipulated sum may be "too high"
when analyzed as anticipated damages, the same sum may be "too
low" when analyzed as actual damages. These nine combinations
and their logical impact demonstrate-even under the disjunctive analy-
sis section 2-718(1) seems to suggest-why the addition of actual dam-
ages only "perpetuates the confusion"'47 and adds very little additional
"liberality." 4' Moreover, because the traditional anticipated damages
test has always been the hybrid anticipated-actual damages analysis,
the addition of "actuar' adds little to what was routinely used by
the courts anyway and signals no affirmative departure from the com-
mon law.
In a combination-by-combination review of the nine possi-
bilities, 49 two obviously nonproblematical situations present them-
selves immediately. If the stipulated sum is "too high" when exam-
ined both as anticipated and actual damages, then the liquidated
damages provision is unreasonable and a penalty and cannot be
saved under either analysis. And if the stipulated sum is approxi-
mately correct when examined both as anticipated and actual dam-
ages, then there will be little problem of enforceability.
There is also one other generally nonproblematic combination.
Should the court determine that as anticipated damages the stipu-
lated sum is unreasonably low, but that it approximates the actual
damages, no problem is raised. The plaintiff, with or without actual
damages as a second chance to validate his liquidated damages clause,
can complain of no injury if he recovers an amount for the injury he
actually did suffer. Having actual damages as an alternative adds
little if anything in this situation.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. BENDER'S, supra note 43, at § 14.08.
49. These nine combinations have been arranged into a matrix, which depicts the logical
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Unfortunately, the other six combinations are not as easily treated.
Problems arise when a court could find either that the stipulated
damages sum yields different outcomes when examined alternatively
as anticipated and actual damages, or that the stipulated sum is
clearly "too low" under both analyses. Whenever a court could
find, through a literally disjunctive damages analysis, different out-
comes of reasonability, the difference itself casts doubt upon the
accuracy of either one or both of the purported reasonability findings.
A court would be likely to avoid the confusion caused by such differ-
ent findings by a general "totality of the circumstances" examination
of reasonability.50 The efficacy of this proposition will be seen in the
following combination-by-combination scrutiny.
The combination that comes to mind most readily is suggested by
the promise of more "liberality" and the notion that the Code drafters
desired to give a liquidated damages clause a second chance at valida-
tion when they added "actual" to section 2-718(1). In this combina-
tion the stipulated sum is unreasonably large as anticipated damages,
but is reasonable (and therefore enforceable) when examined as
actual damages. Literally applying section 2-718(1), a court could
in this manner uphold the stipuated sum. But in actual practice,
should a court find that even though the stipulated sum is unreason-
ably large as anticipated damages and it correctly measures the actual
injuries suffered, the court may be hard pressed to maintain that the
anticipated damages were incorrect in the first instance. If actual
injury comes close to what the parties stipulated-i.e., anticipated-in the
contract, then did they not do a fair and reasonable job of anticipating?
Professor Crowley indicates that
the implementation of [the criterion of actual] may not give rise to an
affirmative departure from common law, for if the actual damages bear a
reasonable relationship to the stipulated sum, this may provide a basis
for a conclusion by the courts that the parties obviously made a good
faith effort to estimate damages in the event of a breach.51
Still, a court could literally state that a stipulated damages sum
is excessive as anticipated damages but correct as actual damages
and therefore enforceable. Corbin commends such a result, stating
that even though at the time of contracting the sum stipulated is dis-
proportionate to the likely injury, if actual injury should prove the
sum stipulated not to be an unreasonable amount for recovery, then
determinations a court would make should it arrive at any particular combination of "actual"
and "anticipated" damages. This matrix is reproduced at page 452 infra.
50. Cf. Crowley's suggestion, in the context of the court's likely response to the second
and third criteria of § 2-718(1), that the precise language of the statute will probably not be
followed, but a general conscionability determination will be made. See note 42 supra.
51. Crowley, supra note 33, at 73.
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there should be "no good reason why the court should not enforce
the provision in the contract."
52
In the three combinations in which the stipulated sum is found to
be "too low" when analyzed as actual damages, the court may view
the liquidated damages provision as a limitation on the plaintiff's
remedy-that the parties bargained that the plaintiff would be able to
recover only up to the stipulated sum, even if his actual injury were
far higher. The Code itself allows such limitations on remedies in
section 2-719(). 53 Any defaulting party could be expected to argue
that the "too low" finding for the stipulated sum when compared
with actual damages was simply a bargained-for limit on the ag-
grieved party's recovery. But if a court could be persuaded that
such an "underliquidated" provision was unreasonably imposed by the
defaulting party at the time of the original contract formation, a
finding of "too low" would then be reason for discarding the stipu-
lated sum's limitation. 54  The Official Comments to section 2-718
suggest such a result, stating that "[a]n unreasonably small amount
[of liquidated damages] would be subject to being held a penalty and
void and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable
contracts or clauses." Moreover, the one combination of these three
with the greatest disparity-in which the stipulated sum is "too
high" as anticipated damages but "too low" as actual damages-may
be unlikely to occur. The fact that as actual damages the stipulated
sum was found to be too low-in essence, an overwrought limitation of
remedy imposed by the defaulting party upon the aggrieved party-
makes it unlikely that a court could simultaneously find that the ag-
grieved party had imposed upon the defaulting party unreasonably
large anticipated damages. Abuse of bargaining power usually is
worked in only one direction in the stipulation of liquidated dam-
ages.
The other two remaining combinations are those in which the
stipulated sum is too high as actual damages but might be found to
be either approximately correct or too low as anticipated damages.
In the former, the "too high" finding as actual damages may cast
doubt on whether the parties "correctly" anticipated the damages at
time of contracting, in that the stipulated sum may have been in-
tended to be a penalty clause. This situation may mean, however,
that the damages that actually ensued simply fell far short of what
any reasonable person could have anticipated. Or they may have done
a poor job of anticipating-after all, parties seldom make the event of
default a major area of their contract negotiations. Whatever the
52. A. CORBIN, supra note 30, at § 1063. But see note 63 infra.
53. The text of § 2-719(1) is set out at note 14 supra.
54. See note 67 infra.
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reason, the court may refuse to enforce the clause in this situation,
going back to the pre-Code notion that the stipulated sum, even if a
reasonable anticipation, must be proportional to the actual damages. 55
The addition of actual makes little difference in this combination.
In the remainifig combination-in which the stipulated sum is too
high as actual damages but too low as anticipated damages-the
great disparity between the two analyses makes this an unlikely
situation. The finding of too high as actual damages casts doubt on
the parties' intent at fairly anticipating damages. Moreover, even
if the damages that actually occurred turned out to be far less than
what a reasonable person could anticipate-even when that reason-
able person would also say that the stipulated sum was itself less than
what could be anticipated-a court may not award the plaintiff re-
covery in excess of the loss he actually suffered. The pre-Code notion
of proportionality to actual injury plays an even more important
role for this combination.
5 6
The above discussion about the nine possible combinations can
be depicted in a matrix, which helps to emphasize the interrelation-
ships between anticipated and actual damages discussed above and
lends support to the proposition that little substantive addition was
made by the inclusion of actual damages. The matrix below repre-
sents the nine different combinations possible when the three out-
comes of "too high," "too low," and "approximately correct" are
distributed over both anticipated damages and the newly added
actual-damages tests.
Logically, under the disjunctive alternatives of section 2-718(1)
a court may begin with either anticipated or actual damages in its
examination of the stipulated sum. But in accordance with tradi-
tion, the assumption is that the court will initially inquire into the
stipulated sum's reasonability by using the anticipated damages
analysis. Hence, it is placed along the top of the matrix, and is the
direction from which the reader should begin his examination. After
the stipulated sum is determined to be one of the three possibilities
when considered as anticipated damages, then the three possible re-
sults of a subsequent examination as actual damages are correlated
in each horizontal row of the matrix. The reader will note the inter-
relationships between the two time foci, and the support that the
matrix lends to the proposition that the traditional anticipated-dam-
ages test has always been the hybrid anticipated-actual damages
test, so that the addition of actual damages adds little to what was
routinely used by the courts anyway.
The following syllogism is suggested to the reader to be used
55. See note 35 supra.
56. Id.
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in the interpretation of the matrix below: If the sum stipulated
in the contract is first examined as anticipated damages, and is de-
termined to be (high/ correct/low), then when the stipulated sum is
subsequently examined as actual damages, and under that standard
to be (high/correct/low), then the interrelation between these ex-
aminations' results will be as indicated in the corresponding square
in the matrix.
ANTICIPATED DAMAGES
Clause will not be
enforced. Non-
problematic.
May literally find
enforcement from
section 2-718; casts
doubt on "too high"
finding as antiepated.
But Hadley v.
Baxendale problems. 7
Casts doubts on
finding of "too high"
as anticipated.
Unlikely to occur.
Plaintiff would
probably be limited
to his bargain unless
unconscionability used
to increase recovery.
APPROX. CORRECT
May indicate that it
was a penalty clause,
or in reality a poor
anticipation. Court
may not enforce, du.
to "proportionality-to
actual" notion.
Clause will be
enforced. Non-
problematic.
TOO LOW
Casts doubt on "too
low" as anticipated
finding. Court may
not enforce due to
"proportionality
to-actual" notion.
Probably non-
problematic.
Plaintiff could show no
injury, as he recovers
his "actual" harm,
Plaintiff would probably be limited to his bargain,
unless a finding of unconscionability is used
to increase his recovery."
The above matrix is an exercise in logic, based on the proposition
that courts will not decide, or cannot decide, reasonability in a vac-
uum and that they will be guided by the totality of circumstances in
determining reasonability. Such determinations will include an ex-
amination of both the anticipation of the parties and the actual harm
that the aggrieved party suffered. The addition of actual damages
adds very little to the traditional "hybrid" test 59 that the courts have
previously used. Thus, the likely result will be that the two time foci
will be molded by application-as they were in Equitable Lumber, and
in actuality always have been in the "anticipated-actuar' test-into
one general "totality of circumstances" examination of reasonability.
C. The Definitional Problem of "Actual"
This use of general reasonability may be further required by the
definitional problems inherent in the use of "actual." Does this ad-
57. The discussion of the Hadley v. Baxendale problems in the definition of "actual"
follows in section IV.C infra.
58. See note 67 infra.
59. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
ACTUAL DAMAGES TOO HIGH
TOO
HIGH
APPROX.
CORRECT
TOO
LOW
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jective mean all damages which flowed from the breach, or only those
damages that a court of law would hold compensable? The familiar
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,60 codified at least in part by Code section
2-715(2),61 that a defaulting party shall not be made to pay for the
limitless entirety of the injury which ensues from a contract breach
has direct application to the point in hand.62 In the left center square
of the matrix, a stipulated sum for damages disproportionately high as
anticipated damages should not find validity through the section
2-718(1) "actual" test in contravention of Hadley, merely because
the damages resulting from the breach-consequential damages for
which the defendant would not otherwise be liable-happen to approxi-
mate the stipulated damages in the contract.6 3  The aggrieved party
should not recover the uncontemplated" totality of his losses because
what was really a penalty clause turns out to approximate the totality
of the losses that party did suffer.
Thus, "actual" must be defined in accordance with the venerated
rule of Hadley-and that defining process will inevitably bring in no-
tions of commercial reasonability and limitations on consequential
damages. Indeed, though in light of Hadley the statute could be
reconstructed by replacing "actual" with a phrase such as "commer-
cially compensable," only circularity would be added, as the goal is
to determine what is "compensable" in the first place. Therefore,
the addition of "actual" of section 2-718(1) cannot effect its pur-
ported promise of more "liberality" unless Hadley is abandoned.
V. EQUITABLE LUMBER'S FORMULATION
The court's initial focus in Equitable Lumber was on the alterna-
tive disjunctive tests of section 2-718(1). The court began its formu-
lation with a relatively literal adherence to the alternative language
60. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep 145 (1854).
61. "Consequential damages resulting from seller's breach include (a) any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which would not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach or warranty."
U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
62. For a discussion of the rule of Hadley in the modern commercial setting, see 37 Ouio
ST. L. 153 (1976).
63. Thus, Corbin's argument that there should be "no good reason" why a court should
not enforce the liquidated damages clause in this particular situation fails in light of Hadley.
While it is true that the actual events that occur later may validate an anticipated damages
clause that seems patently unreasonable when taken at time of contracting, the limits of
Hadley do give a good reason why a court should inquire further into the total of "actual"
damages to see if they are fully compensable.
64. The "second" rule of Hadley is that the proper test for calculating the amount of
damages is an inquiry into what should have been foreseen by the defaulter at the time of
contract formation. Hence, if the defaulting party did contemplate that the aggrieved party
would suffer the "actuar' damages he suffered as a result of the defaulter's breach, then these
damages will be compensable. For a further discussion of this second rule of Hadley, see 37
OHio ST. L.J. 153, 156-57 (1976).
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of the statute. It ruled that the trial court should determine what
the plaintiff would have paid for attorney's fees had it voluntarily
sought legal services on the open market without the expectation of
recovery for those attorney's fees from defendant. The trial court
should then compare this prevailing open-market price with the sum
stipulated in the contract, analyzed as either damages anticipated
at the time of contracting, or actually-suffered damages. If the par-
ties had accurately anticipated what the prevailing legal services
market would charge, then the stipulated provision would be upheld.
Alternatively, if the actual fee arrangement between the plaintiff and
its attorney was in line with the court-determined prevailing legal
market, then the stipulated provision would also be upheld.
But the court of appeals, after remitting to the trial court the
examination of the thirty percent attorney's fee provision under this
alternative anticipated-or-actual damages analysis, went on to state
its controlling test for enforceability-in a relatively confusing manner.
Even if the 30% did correspond to the actual arrangement between
plaintiff and its attorney, the court on remand should determine whether
the amount stipulated was unreasonably large or grossly dispropor-
tionate to the damages which the plaintiff was likely to suffer from breach
in the event it did not rely on respondent's agreement to pay its at-
torney's fees. If the amount is found to be unreaso-qably large, then the
provision is void as a penalty.65
What the court's language does, notwithstanding its stated de-
sire to give efficacy to the alternative examination contemplated by
section 2-718(1), 66 is to effectively substitute "and" in place of the
"or" between "anticipated or actuar' as found in section 2-718(1),
with the result of this conjunction being a commingling of the two
tests into a general reasonability determination. Such a method of
determination leaves in serious question whether a liquidated dam-
ages provision could ever be enforced if it were to fail one alterna-
tive of the section 2-718(1) test while passing the other alternative-a
situation apparently contemplated by the Code drafters when they
added actual damages alongside the common law's anticipated
67damages. Moreover, what the court apparently has done is to
But a conflict exists between Hadley's two rules in the context of liquidated damages,
The argument should not be persuasive that a liquidated damages clause that is unrea-
sonable should still be given efficacy because the party against whom it is directed "con-
templated" those damages by reason of the clause's inclusion. When a liquidated damages
provision is itself under scrutiny, the clause should not be taken to indicate its own rea-
sonability by having been included in the contract; such reasoning only begs the question.
65. 38 N.Y.2d at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
66. "Thus, a liquidated damages provision will be valid if reasonable with respect to
either (1) the harm which the parties anticipated will result from the breach at the time of
contracting or (2) the actual damages suffered by the nondefaulting party at the time of
breach." 38 N.Y.2d at 521, 344 N.E.2d at 395, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
67. Another possible danger with a general "totality of circumstances" reasonability
determination is that a court, may struggle too hard to give efficacy to the second sentence
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vitiate a primary raison d'etre foi liquidated damages clauses: avoid-
ance of the expense and difficulty of protracted court resolution of
contract damages.
Another question the court's above language raises is the effect
of a provision for damages being declared "void as a penalty." If
the court determines that the liquidated damages provision cannot
be enforced as it stands, does this mean that no recovery for the in-
jury contemplated by the penal provision will be allowed? Such a
result, if the case, would itself be a penalty against the party in whose
benefit the original provision was to have run. The policy of the Code
seems to be that the unreasonable liquidated damages provision
ought to be "void as a penalty" only to the extent that it is unreason-
able, and not be limited to a Draconian all-or-nothing dichtomy. Sec-
tion 2-302, pertaining to unconscionability, suggests this result by its
of U.C.C. § 2-718(I), as the New York Court of Appeals apparently did in the Equitable Lum-
ber decision. This sentence voids unreasonably large stipulated damages clauses as penalties.
A court might use this sentence to circumvent the apparent legislative intent to give a "bit
more liberality" to enforcement of liquidated damages clauses.
Indeed, the second sentence of § 2-718(1) is entirely superfluous. As the first sentence
dictates that liquidated damages clauses will be enforceable "only at an amount which is rea-
sonable .. . ." (emphasis added), the addition of the second sentence that "fu]nreasonably large
damages are void as a penalty" does not seem to add anything. Yet it provides substance from
which too much may be inferred.
As Professor Nordstrom depicted it, the second sentence was added by the Code drafters
"with a burst of enthusiasm for the task before them:' R. NORDSTtRO., LAW OF SALES
§ 154 (1970). Logically, if the first sentence provides for enforcement of stipulated damages
only at an amount which is reasonable, then those stipulated sums which are unreasonable
are excluded from enforcement. The danger is that a court may infer that the Code desires
a very strict policy toward-if not an initial presumption against-the enforceability of liquidated
damages clauses. The reasoning might proceed that as the legislature said the same thing
positively and negatively in back-to-back sentences they must have meant something, for the
legislature is not wont to waste words.
Moreover, the second sentence is incomplete: while the first sentence of § 2-718(l) pro-
vides for the only situation where a damages clause may be enforced-when the stipulated
sum is reasonable-the second sentence only prohibits unreasonably large liquidated damages
provisions. The logical question is then: what happens to unreasonably small provisions for
damages? Professor Nordstrom suggests that the "Comments attempt to salvage the situation
by suggesting that the section on unconscionable contracts might be used to strike the under-
liquidated damage clause." Id.
Equitable Lumber evinced the strength that the New York Court of Appeals felt must be
given the second sentence of § 2-718(1). In its statement that although the actual harm test
would be satisfied had plaintiff actually entered into a 30% contingent fee arrangement, the
court said, "it is then necessary, pursuant to the second sentence, . . . to determine whether
the liquidated damages provision is so unreasonably large as to be void as a penalty:' 38 N.Y.2d
at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465. But reasonability should have been established
by the standard of the first sentences of § 2-718(1), which as stated, allows such provisions to
be enforced "only at an amount which is reasonable:' (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the limits on damages recovery articulated by the rule of Hadley v
Baxendale should serve to prevent any manipulation of the actual damage that the court
seems to wish to guard against by reapplying the reasonability test from the second sentence
after such a test supposedly had already been applied from the first sentence. ("While plain-
tiff may enter into any fee arrangement it wishes with counsel, it should not be permitted to
manipulate the actual damage incurred by burdening the defendant with an exorbitant fee
arrangement." 38 N.Y.2d at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465.) Hence, the
presence of the second sentence can lead the court into a double testing of reasonability-a
doubling which could effectively negate any legislative intent to achieve a "bit more liber-
ality." One reasonability test is logically sufficient.
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language that a court "may so limit .. .any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result." This policy should be read
into the language of the court in Equitable Lumber and the effects to
be given in the future to section 2-718(1).
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the promise of a "bit more liberality" upon the addition
of section 2-718(1) to the Code, when the pragmatic application of
this section to the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions is
analyzed, little additional liberality and clarity have been realized.
Equitable Lumber, in its attempt to deal with the literal words of sec-
tion 2-718(1) ended up with a general reasonability determination
based on the entirety of the commercial situation. While such a gen-
eral examination may be more ingenuous than the traditional anti-
cipated damages standard, such an examination can vitiate the one
major advantage of liquidated damages clauses-specifically, the avoid-
ance of the time and expense of a protracted presentation of evidence
to establish the total commercial situation. As long as the statute
remains in its present form, courts will inevitably be tempted to re-
treat to general reasonability determinations after wrestling with the
literal language of the statute. Perhaps the statute should literally
be amended to substitute "and" in place of "or" between section
2-718(1)'s alternatives. At least the statute would be more ingenuous
in that form. But the caveat that should also appear with any such
amendment, as well as being commercially desirable advice for courts
dealing with the present statute, is that an unnecessarily strict degree
of scrutiny should not be applied to liquidated damages clauses. If
their effectiveness is not to be diminished to the point of virtual use-
lessness in liquidating the damages to be recovered in the event of
breach, then courts should allow the same degree of contractual free-
dom between commercial parties under section 2-718(1) as they have
under section 2-302.6s The Code drafters desired more liberality
when they promulgated section 2-718(1); the courts should allow
commercial parties to take advantage of it.
Geoffry V. Case
68. See note 17 supra.
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